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We assessed in a case-control study the test-validity of
Aedes larval indices for the 2000 Havana outbreak. “Cases”
were blocks where a dengue fever patient lived during the
outbreak. “Controls” were randomly sampled blocks.
Before, during, and after the epidemic, we calculated
Breteau index (BI) and house index at the area, neighbor-
hood, and block level. We constructed receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves to determine their performance
as predictors of dengue transmission. We observed a pro-
nounced effect of the level of measurement. The BImax (max-
imum block BI in a radius of 100 m) at 2-month intervals had
an area under the ROC curve of 71%. At a cutoff of 4.0, it
significantly (odds ratio 6.00, p<0.05) predicted transmis-
sion with 78% sensitivity and 63% specificity. Analysis of BI
at the local level, with human-defined boundaries, could be
introduced in control programs to identify neighborhoods at
high risk for dengue transmission.
W
hile a vaccine is under research, without immediate
prospect for success, vector control remains the only
way to prevent dengue transmission (1–3). Vector control
programs are essentially based on source reduction, elimi-
nating  Aedes aegypti larval habitats from the domestic
environment, with increasing community involvement and
intersectoral action in recent decades (4,5). However, cur-
rent entomologic indicators do not seem to reliably assess
transmission risks, define thresholds for dengue epidemic
alerts, or set targets for vector control programs (6,7).
Therefore, defining new indicators for entomologic sur-
veillance, monitoring, and evaluation are among the
research priorities of the World Health Organization
Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical
Diseases.
Although only adult female Aedes mosquitos are direct-
ly involved in dengue transmission, entomologic surveil-
lance has been based on different larval indices (8,9). The
house index (HI, percentage of houses positive for larvae)
and the Breteau index (BI, number of positive containers
per 100 houses) have become the most widely used indices
(6), but their critical threshold has never been determined
for dengue fever transmission (9,10). Since HI≤1% or
BI≤5 was proposed to prevent yellow fever transmission,
these values have also been applied to dengue transmission
but without much evidence (8,11). The Pan American
Health Organization described 3 levels of risk for dengue
transmission: low (HI<0.1%), medium (HI 0.1%–5%), and
high (HI>5%) (12), but these values need to be verified
(13). The vector density, below which dengue transmission
does not occur, continues to be a topic of much debate and
conflicting empiric evidence. For example, dengue out-
breaks occurred in Singapore when the national overall HI
was <1% (14). In contrast, researchers from Fortaleza,
Brazil, found that dengue outbreaks never occurred when
HI was <1% (15). However, different geographic levels are
used to calculate the indices in the various studies, and the
appropriated level for entomologic indices is in itself an
issue of debate (16). Furthermore, the appropriateness of
larval indices has been questioned; recently, as an alterna-
tive, pupal indices were developed by Focks et al. (7) to
better reflect the risk for transmission. Still, their utility for
source reduction programs is controversial, and the feasi-
bility of pupal collection in routine Aedes surveillance is
untested (17).
In this study, we assessed the usefulness of larval
indices for identifying high-risk areas for dengue virus
transmission. We examine the influence of measurements
at different geographic levels, establish a threshold for epi-
demic outbreaks, and discuss their utility for community-
based Aedes control programs.
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Context
The Cuban dengue prevention program has been hailed
as among the few success stories in Aedes control (18,19).
It was initiated in 1981, during the first dengue hemorrhag-
ic fever epidemic in the Americas (20). As a result of this
effort, Cuba was free of dengue from 1982 to 1996,
although  Aedes was reported again from 1992 (21). In
1997, dengue transmission occurred in Santiago de Cuba, a
municipality located in the eastern part of the country (22).
The epidemic remained limited to this city, but Aedes mos-
quitoes were observed in 29 other municipalities, including
Havana, the capital city, in the northwest of the country.
After intensification of vector control activities in the entire
country (22), HIs from 0.05% to 0.91% were observed in
Havana between 1997 and 2001 (23). In spite of these low
indices, an outbreak of 138 cases of dengue fever occurred
in September and October 2000; both dengue 3 and dengue
4 viruses were isolated (1). Dengue serotypes 3 and 4 had
never circulated in Cuba, and we can assume low or nonex-
istent immunity in the population. From June 2001 to
February 2002, a new outbreak occurred, and 12,889 new
dengue cases were confirmed (23).
Study Area
The study was conducted in Playa Municipality, in the
northwest of Havana. The municipality has an area of
34.90 km2 and a population of 182,485 inhabitants. It has
an average annual temperature of 25°C and precipitation
of 132.9 mm in the rainy season (May–October). The pop-
ulation density is 5,228 habitants per square kilometer. The
municipality has a noncontinuous water supply (every 2
days) and irregular garbage collection. It is divided into 9
health areas, each providing primary care to ≈30,000 peo-
ple. We performed an in-depth study in the 5 health areas
where dengue transmission occurred in the September–
October 2000 epidemic.
Study Design
We conducted a case-control study. Two units of analy-
sis were used: blocks of houses (a block has on average 50
houses) and neighborhoods, which were defined as a block
plus surrounding blocks (this definition generally results in
clusters of 9 blocks with a radius of ≈100 m). These units
are defined by manmade boundaries and not by ecologic
determinants, per se, to usefully guide community-based
control. We defined a “case” as a block (or neighborhood)
of houses in the study area where ≥1 inhabitant was detect-
ed with confirmed dengue fever during the September–
October 2000 outbreak. “Control” blocks (or neighbor-
hoods) were randomly sampled from those in the study
area where no dengue case was reported.
Data Collection
Dengue Fever
Dengue cases were defined as patients with fever and ≥2
symptoms of dengue fever such as myalgia, arthralgia,
headache, and rash, with serologic confirmation by
immunoglobulin M–capture enzyme-linked immunosor-
bent assay (1,12) at the national reference laboratory of
viral diseases in the Institute of Tropical Medicine, Havana.
During the epidemic, suspected cases were identified
through the health services. Additionally, a seroepidemio-
logic survey was conducted in the study area at the end of
October 2000; all family physicians made home visits to
families under their responsibility, searching for recent
denguelike illnesses. Blood samples were collected from
all persons with a history of fever.
All confirmed dengue patients (passively and actively
found) were interviewed by their family physician, super-
vised by an epidemiologist of the health area, to determine
the exact date of symptom onset and places visited in the
10 preceding days. The completeness of the collected
information was verified by epidemiologists of the
Institute of Tropical Medicine, and if necessary, patients
were revisited.
Entomologic Information
We used entomologic surveillance data that were inde-
pendently recorded by the National Vector Control
Program. At 2-month intervals, vector control technicians
exhaustively inspected every house in the Playa
Municipality for larval stages of Ae. aegypti. We used data
collected in 3 cycles, July–August 2000 (before the epi-
demic), September–October 2000 (during the epidemic),
and November–December 2000 (after the epidemic). We
extracted information on the number of inspected houses,
positive containers (with Ae. aegypti pupae or larvae), and
houses with ≥1 positive container. We eliminated 4.8% of
the blocks from the study because they were not inspected
in the 3 inspection cycles.
Data Analysis
We related all data collected to geographic coordinates
by a unique house block code and introduced it in MapInfo
software (MapInfo Corporation, Troy, NY, USA). Case-
patients were located by their address in the corresponding
block. For the 3 entomologic inspection cycles, HI and BI
were calculated at the block, neighborhood, and health area
level. Additionally, we identified the BImax, which is the
highest or maximum BI at the block level for each neigh-
borhood of the case and control blocks included in the
study. This variable is derived with the following equation:
,
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= max maxwhere BIi is the BI of the ith block belonging to the con-
cerned neighborhood N, and ∀i⊂N indicates that all BIi of
N are considered to identify the BI with the highest value
as BImax.
All data were exported to SPSS (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL, USA) for analysis. We calculated the Spearman rank
correlation coefficient between the different indices in the
3 inspection cycles. The entomologic indices were trans-
formed to approximately normal distributions (by using
square root transformation) for calculating means, stan-
dard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals. Differences
in the distribution of the indices were assessed with the
Mann-Whitney test.
We assessed the discriminative power of the indices by
using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.
Their accuracy to discriminate between case and control
blocks (and neighborhoods) was classified according to
the value of the area under the ROC curve (AUC) (24) as
noninformative (AUC≤0.5), less accurate (0.5<AUC≤0.7),
moderately accurate (0.7<AUC≤0.9), highly accurate
(0.9<AUC<1) and perfect (AUC = 1). The value of the
indices with the highest sensitivity, >50% specificity, for
discriminating case and control geographic units was taken
as the optimal cutoff point. The lower limit of 50% speci-
ficity was set to safeguard positive predictive value and
decrease the number of units falsely classified at high risk
for dengue transmission, which triggers unnecessary
action and generates unproductive costs. The association
between the entomologic indices and dengue transmission
was further explored by logistic regression models.
Results
During the epidemic, health services assisted 4,679
febrile patients in the 5 health areas included in the study.
All patients were serologically tested 5 days after onset of
fever, and dengue infection was confirmed in 47.
In the seroepidemiologic survey, 82.5% of the families
were effectively visited by their family physician. The sur-
vey found 7,008 persons with symptoms of fever between
September and October 2000 who had not previously
attended the health services. Serum specimens were col-
lected from all of them, and dengue infection was con-
firmed in 22.
As a result, 69 (47 passively identified plus 22 actively
identified) dengue cases were confirmed, all patients were
interviewed, and 4 cases epidemiologically related to out-
breaks in other municipalities were excluded from the
study. The final sample consisted of 65 confirmed dengue
fever patients who lived in 38 different blocks in the 5
health areas included in the study.
In the July to August inspection cycle, before the out-
break, the overall municipal BI and HI were 0.92 and
0.87%, respectively (Table 1). The mean values of the
indices calculated at the health area level were also ≈1 for
areas with or without dengue cases during the subsequent
epidemic. However, the mean BI and HI were >1 for case
neighborhoods and substantially <1 for neighborhoods
without cases. During the epidemic, the effect of the level
of measurement of the indices was still more pronounced.
The HI and BI at the municipality level were 1.53% and
1.73, respectively, but all health areas with dengue cases
attained a BI >1. Even more marked differences existed at
the block and neighborhood levels, and after the outbreak
the indices returned to average values <1 at all levels of
measurement. The mean values for case blocks and neigh-
borhoods were, in all instances, consistently substantially
and significantly higher (all p<0.05) than those for corre-
sponding control units. A high correlation was observed
between block-level BI and HI values (r≥0.94, p<0.05). In
most positive houses (89.6%), only 1 container with Aedes
larvae or pupae was found.
The Figure shows the spatial distribution of Ae. aegyp-
ti larval infestation during the inspection cycles before,
during, and after the epidemic and the location of the
dengue fever cases in the first (September) and second
(October) month of dengue virus transmission. In most
blocks (70%), no Aedes infestation was present before the
epidemic period, but 8.8% of blocks had BI values >4,
with a maximum BI of 50. Of the 17 confirmed dengue
patients in September, only 3 (18%) lived in a block with
BI≥4 in the July–August inspection cycle. However, 15
(88%) lived in a neighborhood with at least 1 block with
BI≥4. The Aedes infestation increased during the second
inspection cycle and then decreased again, concurrent with
the intensified vector control activities during the epidem-
ic. From November to December, after the outbreak,
71.6% of house blocks were Aedes-free, while 6.3% had
BI>4.
The mean block BI, the mean neighborhood BI, and the
mean BImax for case and control blocks are given in
Table 2. Before the epidemic, the mean BI values were
approximately equal for case and control units. However,
the BImax values were significantly higher for neighbor-
hoods of case blocks. While transmission started in neigh-
borhoods with high BImax infestation levels, it spread into
blocks and neighborhoods with lower mean BI values in
October. Still, during the epidemic, the indices remained
systematically and significantly higher in case blocks.
After the epidemic, they returned to similar values for case
and control units.
The entomologic indices from inspection cycles before
and during the epidemic were less to moderately accurate
at predicting subsequent transmission. The highest AUC
value, 0.71, was attained with the BImax from the July to
August inspection cycle. At the cutoff of 4.07, it reached
a sensitivity of 77.8% and a specificity of 63.2% for
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BI≥1.30 gave similar results. Block-level BIs were less
accurate. Comparable cutoff points for the indices in the
September to October inspection cycle discriminate best
for predicting transmission in October (data not shown).
After the epidemic, in the November to December inspec-
tion cycle, the indices had a high specificity: 89.6% for
BI<1 and 85.7% for BImax<4, which points toward their
usefulness in nonepidemic periods.
Table 3 shows the odds ratios (OR) for dengue trans-
mission at optimal BI cutoff values. From July to August,
consistent with previous results, only BImax≥4 was a signif-
icant predictor for identifying blocks with a case in
September (OR 6.00, p<0.05). In contrast, the OR for all
the different September–October BIs were significant;
blocks above threshold had 3–5 times the chance of having
a dengue case in October. Additionally, during the out-
break, the presence of a single positive container in a block
was associated with a higher risk for dengue transmission
(OR 3.49, p<0.05).
Discussion
We show that entomologic indices, BI in particular,
allow identification of geographic units at high risk for
dengue transmission. However, in regions with low Ae.
aegypti density, identifying such units requires analysis at
different levels, i.e., for blocks and neighborhoods, and
short intervals between inspection cycles. Optimal cutoff
values were identified for our study setting.
The existence of detailed surveillance data before, dur-
ing, and after the dengue epidemic in Playa Municipality
offered a unique opportunity to analyze entomologic infor-
mation at different geographic levels. Entomologic data
collected through routine systems, however, has some lim-
itations. First, larval prevalence was possibly slightly
underestimated: blocks were inspected by different vector
control technicians, procedures used may not have been
completely standardized, and few data are (randomly)
missing. Second, when dengue cases were reported, the
control program intensified, and more Aedes foci may
have been detected. Third, sampling Aedes aegypti can be
time sensitive (25), and our inspection cycles at 2-month
intervals may not have fully captured the temporal vari-
ability of the entomologic indices. Besides, we may not
have been able to identify all dengue patients who were
Aedes Larval Indices and Risk for Dengue Epidemics
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Figure. Spatial distribution of dengue cases and Breteau indices
(BI) at the block level before, during, and after the dengue out-
break, Playa Municipality, Havana, 2000.infected outside their area of residence. Also, the study
design did not allow us to detect asymptomatic dengue
infections, which likely occurred in some control blocks
and neighborhoods. However, we expect the potential mis-
classification to be nondifferential, i.e., independent of the
entomologic indices. Furthermore, the experience of the
technicians of the vector control program, their close
supervision (including systematic revisiting of 33.3% of
the inspected houses), and the interviews conducted with
all dengue patients to exclude outside infection guarantee
that biases, if any, are minimal.
Various researchers have investigated the relationship
between dengue transmission and the Aedes population,
expressed as larval (15,26–31), pupal (7,13,32), and adult
indices (33). Moore (28) in Puerto Rico and Pontes (15) in
Fortaleza, Brazil, used temporal graphics to compare the
seasonal fluctuation of rainfall, Aedes larval indices, and
dengue incidence. They observed a strong relation in the
patterns of the 3 series. In Puerto Rico, the peak incidence
of confirmed infection followed the peak larval density by
≈1 month. In Salvador, Brazil, sentinel surveillance in 30
areas detected a significant 1.4× higher seroincidence
when the HI was >3% (31). Recently, Scott and Morrison
(16) showed that traditional larval indices in Peru are cor-
related with the prevalence of human dengue infections.
The variety of thresholds proposed in these and other stud-
ies could be partially explained by different methods and
geographic levels of analysis used, but other factors influ-
ence the relationship between Aedes density and transmis-
sion risk, such as herd immunity (11), population density
(31), mosquito-human interaction (34), virus strain, and
climate, which affects mosquito biology and mosquito-
virus interactions (16).
Entomologic indices, however, were strongly associat-
ed with transmission, and we used ROC analysis (24) to
assess the potential of these indices to predict in which
blocks transmission would occur and to select an operating
point that would provide an optimum tradeoff between
false-positive and false-negative results (35). BImax≥4 fol-
lowed by neighborhood BI≥1 during the preceding ≈2
months provides good predictive discrimination. At longer
intervals, the sensitivity of these indices becomes too low.
More frequent inspection cycles might perform better
since Aedes needs only 9–12 days to develop from egg to
adult (36). Care should, however, be taken when extrapo-
lating these findings to communities with other herd
immunity levels or different environmental conditions.
Our data also show that the geographic level of analy-
sis determines the Aedes indices obtained. Marked hetero-
geneity is not only found inside Playa Municipality but
also inside smaller health areas. Indices at the neighbor-
hood level perform best, followed by indices at the block
level. Geographic scale has too often been neglected when
dengue transmission is studied. In general, overall indices
are calculated for communities (sometimes of different
sizes) defined by administrative boundaries, which do not
constitute entomologically homogeneous units. Notwith-
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from the literature, in which it is sometimes mentioned.
Chan et al. (27) noted that HI in different sections of
Singapore’s Chinatown varied from 10.2% to 25.0%.
However, Goh et al. (30) reported an overall HI of 2.4% in
Singapore, but at the level of 7 blocks taken together
(approximately the same scale as our neighborhood), HI
up to 17.9% were found. Tran et al. (36) defined 400 m and
40 days as the spatial and temporal boundaries of maxi-
mum dengue transmission in a dengue focus. Perez et al.
(37) identified areas in Havana with heterogeneous risks
for vector infestation by using a geographic information
system. Spatial heterogeneity has also been observed at the
household level for both Aedes populations (10,38,39) and
dengue transmission (26,29,40), but this level seems less
suitable for identifying areas for intervention. Blocks or
neighborhoods, given the epidemiologic situation in our
study area, are a more appropriate scale.
The unit of analysis used in our study, the block, is
based on manmade boundaries. While these may not
describe the ecology of risk, they seem to be useful mark-
ers from the perspective of community-based control inter-
ventions. In most settings, appropriately sized and locally
meaningful geographic units could be similarly defined for
entomologic surveillance, but the use of different bound-
aries or different analytical techniques could produce dif-
ferent results.
In our study, BI≥1 and BImax≥4 seemed to be a suitable
action threshold and target, respectively, in community
based dengue prevention. However, these results are
derived from the analysis of 1 epidemic, and the thresholds
identified may not constitute suitable targets in another
epidemic or in locations where different ecologic condi-
tions prevail. Similar studies in future epidemics and in
other settings are necessary to verify the general applica-
bility of our results.
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